The vastity of the cosmos would imply that the effort of humanity to expand its limits beyond planet Earth could only be a global endeavor. Yet, while space diplomacy has demonstrated its ability to keep countries working together in space while having differences on Earth, the world is becoming increasingly fragmented, and international cooperation and multilateralism are at stake. The Outer Space Treaty (OST), being at the same time the foundation of international space law and a valuable reference treaty for space activities, clarifies that outer space is the province of “(hu)mankind” and its peaceful uses must benefit each and every country independently from their level of economic and technological development. This notion brings with it two main derived concepts: the need to democratise access to space and the need to consider space as a global common, to be used by the current generation and to remain available for future ones. This concept has been underlined in the United Nations (UN) Pact for the Future, the outcome document of the UN 2024 Summit of the Future, which considers space as an important area of interest when it comes to common goods. While UN multilateralism is at work and produces such important reference documents for humanity, we continue to experience also other important examples of international cooperation at its best, such as the International Space Station (ISS), where operations in space continue between Japan, the Russian Federation, Europe, Canada and the United States. However, the increased fragmentation we experience at the geopolitical level implies that the mechanism which has been functioning for many decades is now jammed. The key question is: what future can we envisage for cooperation in outer space?
Multilateralism in outer space
The space regime that emerged after the Second World War was built on a legal and institutional framework that made cooperation possible even during the Cold War and, in general, in an era of geopolitical rivalry. Its foundation was, and still is, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which established key principles such as the peaceful uses of outer space, the prohibition of national appropriation, no placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit and state responsibility for space activities. The other four treaties worked in the same direction, with the aim of regulating outer space activities as the basis for a peaceful and cooperative approach to them. With this aim, also, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was created in 1958, and so was the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs – UNOOSA. They offer multilateral platforms for discussions, standard-setting and norm-building. The UN system provides, also in modern times with the approval of non-binding guidelines, the forum in which member states see the strategic value of cooperating, and it does so in a top-down approach. At the same time, we have experienced, and we still do, one of the best examples of international cooperation in space: the International Space Station. First module launched in 1998, from the Russian Federation, followed by an American module. It has been assembled over several years, and, nowadays, it is successfully jointly operated by the five partners, Japan, Russian Federation, Europe, Canada and the USA. It should be decommissioned and deorbited by 2030, but its final destiny (probably Point Nemo in the Pacific Ocean) is still under discussion. One of the reasons why the ISS is not affected by the geopolitical tensions on Earth is connected to the strong interdependence of the various players in this endeavor. Russia and the USA, in particular, need to work together to ensure the operations of the station, and so do the others: the crews on board could not survive without the strong collaboration required from all partners, underlying how interdependence can lead to diplomacy. However, it is more a coalition-based approach, with only few countries cooperating, while in line with the multilateral approach, and at the same time, different. In these very days, we are witnessing some other initiatives of this kind taking shape, with various geopolitical geometries.
The geopolitisation of orbits
While we have a multilateral system which has been operating properly over the last decades, we experience a new space race, this time between the US and China, an increasing number of private and public players in the sector, grouping of countries around specific programmes, and private players advanced enough to control the market on a global scale. The conclusion we can draw is that space diplomacy and international cooperation in space are no longer expected to be successful, and outer space will reflect more closely the geopolitical and geoeconomical tensions we experience on Earth. This is where the concept of technopolar space emerges. It refers to an emerging order in which control over space is no longer exercised primarily by nations, but increasingly by a small set of tech-sovereign actors – particularly American entrepreneurs (Musk, Bezos) and US-based technology firms. In this framework, geopolitical power derives from ownership and governance of critical infrastructure such as launch systems, satellite constellations (broadband connectivity, cloud computing, EO), data pipelines and AI-driven analytics platforms, rather than from traditional military or territorial assets. Private companies are currently already functioning as quasi-state actors, shaping who gains access to orbital services and under what political and commercial conditions. This aligns also with the notion of a “technological republic”, where power is concentrated in an alliance between national security institutions and technocratic firms that design and operate core digital and AI-enabled infrastructures. In space, this produces a hierarchical, technopolar orbital structure, with a US centric core, and a periphery of states dependent on these. Connectivity and data provision may become instruments of strategic leverage, forcing the other players to navigate dependencies, technology-transfer restrictions and security-driven conditions.
At the same time, countries such as China and Russia, as well as EU and BRICS members, are building potentially rival constellations, data ecosystems and dual-use/security space capabilities, attempting to reduce reliance on this concentrated power and carve out their own sphere of influence. This dynamic intensifies the geopolitisation of orbits, as space-based infrastructure becomes a frontline of broader technological and military competition among major powers. Existing international space law regimes struggle to keep pace, as agile and well-funded private ventures outpace slow, consensus-based governance. So, has cooperation been fully replaced, or is it close to being replaced, by competition? And is global governance shifting from member states to multipolar both state and non-state powers?
The current state of affairs
While COPUOS continues its work on the second set of guidelines for the long term sustainability of outer space activities and focuses on space resources, lunar exploration is increasingly taking centre stage. This comes amidst preparations for UNISPACE IV in 2027, which marks both the 60th anniversary of the first global conference UNISPACE I, and the 50th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty, where member states aim to reach a consensus on global governance and a space traffic coordination mechanism. And so, it does the attempt of building international coalitions around the world to establish a permanent presence on the Moon, namely the Artemis programme and the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). The Artemis programme brings with it the Artemis Accords, a non-binding set of principles to be applied to the peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies, built mainly on the OST by adding practical rules on transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration of space objects, protection of space heritage and responsible use of space resources. The Artemis accords, as per the 15th of May 2026, count 67 signatories. The project is led by National Aeronautical and Space Association (NASA) and the main objective is the South Pole, where water, helium-3 and rare earths can be extracted. ILRS is instead led by China and Russia, and the accords around it count already 13 countries: their main goal is to land at the South Pole and establish a research center there. These accords have to be considered as coalition-based, non-UN-related agreements, where the two coalitions are in fact aggregating supposed like-minded countries, with the good exception of the two countries, Thailand and Senegal, which are standing out as signatories of both, building a sort of diplomatic bridge. In a way, this time, the exploration of the Moon is not showing only the race between two countries anymore (Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War, China and the USA now), but also a strong cooperative approach, considering that almost 80 countries signed the accords overall. Looking at the glass half full, it is a very good sign. They could have taken into greater consideration the Moon agreement, the fifth treaty approved in 1984, signed by only 17 countries as per today. There are a lot of very interesting principles in it, even if the main space powers are not supportive. However, with instruments like the Artemis and ILRS accords, the signatories may have a more flexible regulatory environment, more rapid decision-making processes and full authoritative power. And, instead of committing in general terms, the signatories may have the freedom to join this programme and not others. However, if we aim at responsible behavior in outer space, the norms have to be agreed and respected by all players, no one excluded, and the mechanism to approve the norms must be multilateral. Do we risk experiencing parallel sets of norms, potentially similar, yet still different?
Towards global governance
At the moment, with the Artemis and ILRS programmes being the predominant frameworks for the exploration of the Solar System, we indeed risk increased fragmentation and, even worse, potential confrontation. However, there are few areas where a multilateral approach cannot be avoided, in particular when it comes to space traffic coordination and the management of space debris. The reason is that rules and principles approved by a subset of member states would leave room for mistakes and potential incidents in orbit, which all the operators are keen to avoid. It is in this perspective that we welcome again the Pact for the Future and its action n. 56, which calls for member states to agree on principles for a space traffic coordination mechanism and on a global governance regime, potentially at the occasion of UNISPACE IV. The operators, and particularly the private ones, need a common legislative framework to maintain predictability in space and preserve their orbital assets. Despite the geopolitical fragmentation we are experiencing, it seems that multilateralism together with coalition-based initiatives which bring together subsets of like-minded member states in a variable configuration would become the new norm. However, this was not alien for outer space in the past. A small coalition of states has been working together on the ISS, but cooperation in Moon exploration is taking another shape. The vast participation of developing and emerging countries to the Artemis and ILRS accords also shows that these new mechanisms seem to be in line with the OST when allowing for the participation of a variety of countries and competencies. At the same time, the role and relevance of the UN should be reinforced, in the interest of all stakeholders. In terms of governance, so vital in this respect, it may be the right time to create a UN Space Global Agency in charge of global challenges, such as the allocation of landing sites for the exploration of the Moon, space traffic coordination and other relevant issues. However, this would require a giant leap towards multilateralism again, but it would also reassure all actors involved about the enforcement of a balanced and non-discriminatory process in the allocation and management of space resources.
Conclusions
In conclusion, space cooperation will not be replaced, but it is being reshaped by fragmentation, competition and the growing weight of private actors. The UN-centered multilateral order remains essential as a legal and normative reference, especially for issues such as space traffic coordination, debris mitigation and the long-term sustainability of outer space activity. Yet, its practical influence is increasingly constrained by geopolitical and geoeconomical rivalry and by the emergence of flexible coalitions and commercial players. The challenge is therefore not to abandon multilateralism, but to adapt it to a more crowded, contested and technologically driven environment. If space has to remain accessible and governable, cooperation must combine globally approved norms with more agile forms of coordination. In the end, the future of space governance will hinge on the ability of states to reconcile strategic rivalry with the preservation of workable jointly agreed rules.
Multilateralism at Stake: What Future for Space Cooperation?
